Let us imagine that the opposition parties will boycott the forthcoming elections scheduled for next year. How will such a boycott affect the country and our democracy? And is boycott the best option?
Cameroon and Tanzania experienced election boycotts by the opposition recently, but that has not affected the overall rating of the election results.
In 2000, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a massive boycott by the opposition which resulted in 37.4 per cent in participation. The same with Gambia parliamentary election in 2002 and in Guinea in 2003. The same with the Ivorian presidential election in 2020.
The electoral boycott has become a regular tool for political opposition parties to use, especially since the end of the Cold War. With the rise of new democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa, an increase in contested elections also has brought with it an increase in decisions to boycott. Whereas only four percent of all elections worldwide were boycotted in 1989, that number had risen to 15 percent by 2002. In the decade 1995–2004, an average of nearly 10 elections per year was boycotted.
The opposition to Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe also fractured over boycott discussions in 2005. That year, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) lost 16 seats in the parliamentary elections—in part because dithering over a possible boycott kept MDC registration numbers down. Following that setback, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai made the fateful decision to boycott the elections for the newly created Senate, claiming that this body would be a rubber stamp for Mugabe. Not surprisingly, this created tension within the MDC as a sizable faction believed that choosing not to participate would be a fateful error. The party splintered, Tsvangirai lost his mandate, and the ruling ZANU-PF party captured 49 of 66 seats in the Senate election against the fractured opposition. Tsvangirai was able to patch things up by choosing to participate in the 2008 elections—resulting in near-parity in seats between ZANU-PF and the MDC—but he undercut himself in the presidential election. In the first round, Tsvangirai actually outpaced Mugabe, but the government claimed that he fell short of the 50 percent threshold necessary to avoid a runoff. In protest, Tsvangirai decided to boycott the runoff election, allowing Mugabe to triumph handily, turning victory into setback. While the eventual power-sharing deal gave the MDC an unprecedented stake in the government, Tsvangirai’s boycott allowed Mugabe to retain the top governmental position.
Given the logistical preparations necessary to hold elections, opposition parties must be goaded into participation as early as possible to avoid missing registration windows or harming electoral chances. Too often, opposition parties come to the decision to participate too late to achieve the full effect. The threat of a boycott can pay dividends but the opposition parties still have to participate in order to receive the full benefits. Choosing to sit out is almost always a losing proposition.
First, if elections receive a great deal of attention from the international community, then a boycott can be effective. Thus, the opposition’s threat of an election boycott, when it attracts the attention of international audiences, increases international pressure on the incumbent. As a result, the ruler or ruling party is forced to make concessions. The most striking example of this is South Africa’s vote in 1994, when the president of the Freedom Party Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s decision to boycott the election and denounce the electoral process as unfree and unfair led to an increase of international pressure on Nelson Mandela. Consequently, the threat of boycotting the election by Buthelezi caused the abolishment of the single-vote system, and amendments to the constitution with regard to local self-government.
Secondly, if boycotts are part of the opposition’s street-protest campaign, then they can pay dividends. If the opposition enjoys strong domestic popular support and a boycott is also part of their overall campaign involving street protests and other activities, then these boycotts can yield results. An example of this is the 1996 election and opposition boycott in Bangladesh. The Awami League, an opposition party, launched massive protests that swept the country along with a boycott two days before election day. The general opposition’s boycott and ongoing street protests eventually pushed the government to hold a new election and the opposition faction managed to win that election.
The slogan “Boycott the boycottables” was first introduced to Nigerian political vocabulary by Chief Ojike Mazi Mbonu (1912–1956). The slogan was a rallying cry at that time for nationalism. He did, in practice, generate greater enthusiasm for Nigerian traditional clothes by his “boycott” methods which involved a preference for traditional clothes as opposed to English-styled ones.
to be concluded…
