Postscript by Waziri Adio
Whichever way it is looked at and whichever way it is finally resolved, the scandal around an ungainly-named presidential council is a monumental mess. There should be adequate checks and controls in place to nip this sordid saga in the bud and to spare the current administration and the whole country the needless blushes. These checks and controls are still there and are institutionalised, backed by processes, circulars, laws and even the constitution.
But they failed, not because they are weak by design or intent but because they were neutralised by the patronage cum subservient character of our politics and public administration. The disgrace was avoidable but it is inevitable in a way. There are probably countless other such matters that are not yet in the open, and there are likely to be more in the future unless we understand why established protocols failed in this instance and we make a conscious and concerted effort to address them.
Based on my experience working in government as the head of a federal agency, I have my theory about what probably happened concerning the Presidential Foreign Intervention Promotion Council (PFIPC). But I do not intend to go into the weeds of the PFIPC issue or namecheck anyone because the matter is sub-judice. We should all allow the courts to do their job. In addition to that, it will be important for the government to undertake an open and thorough investigation to track what went wrong and where, and ensure that identified administrative gaps are blocked and that all those involved, actively and passively, face the music. This is a serious issue, deserving of more than the treatment it has received thus far.
My intervention will focus on a few of the things we know already and identify where and why existing protocols failed. For now, we know that the Presidential Economic Advisory Council/Presidential Foreign Intervention Promotion Council was allocated N1.3 billion in the 2026 federal budget. This allocation was both in the proposed budget and the approved budget. So, there was a budgetary provision for PEAC/PFIPC under Budget Code 0111062001 and budget line18 under the budget of the Presidency and it was not one of the usual insertions or additions at the National Assembly. In fact, the budget was passed as it was proposed. This can be ascertained by comparing pages 50 and 51 of the 2026 Appropriation Bill with pages 33 to 35 of the 2026 Appropriation Act.
We also know that the council opened accounts at the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) as required of all government institutions after the full implementation of the Treasury Single Account (TSA). The PFIPC accounts at CBN could only have happened after approval by the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF), which is a laborious, six-step process involving due diligence by OAGF, issuance of signatory forms, forwarding of request to and documentation (including biometric capture) at CBN. By virtue of a story in The Cable, an online newspaper, we can also confirm that PEAC/PFIPC got a waiver from the Office of the Head of Service on 7th August 2025, “based on the 2025 approved establishment position of the agency” to employ 300 staff, including 10 directors and 20 assistant directors. We also know that the institution operated from an office at the Federal Secretariat in Abuja, which it could not have assigned to itself.
There are many valid questions that should have been asked in the various processes, checks and controls built around budget allocation (proposal, defence and approval), accounts opening at the CBN, employment waiver approval and office assignment. The questions should not just be about whether the FEAC/PFIPC is validly created but whether it is necessary at all and the conditions that should be met for it to draw money directly or indirectly from the public purse. These questions were not asked either because those who should have asked them stood to benefit or chose to defer to higher authorities or were in on the game.
To start with, there should be a process for creating a government institution, including presidential committees. Needless to say, the president has enormous powers in a presidential system, and can literally create and abolish any public institutions. But this enormous power should be well documented in reals of paperwork, including originating memos providing the rationale, approvals, conveyance and public announcement. Also, there is usually a central institution for issuing appointment letters for government appointees at a certain level. Government is a paperwork factory, and government is defined by processes, sometimes convoluted and annoying but intended to provide safeguards against whims and abuses.
The problem though is that not all paperwork is visible to everyone and not all established protocols are always adhered to. If, for example, it is said that the president wants something done or it is assumed that the president wants something done, there is no way for those down the ladder to crosscheck or confirm. But this does not mean that civil servants do whatever they are told to do or just do whatever they think political higher-ups want done. The bureaucracy exists not just to carry out orders but also to guide and advise the political authorities and gatekeep government processes. However, most bureaucrats are too eager to please or too keen to stay at their juicy posts (instead of being sent to the Siberia) or just content with protecting themselves with written direction. Even when there is good faith, the information lacuna and the subservient mindset create a gap that can be exploited by those with nefarious agenda.
A critical question that should have been asked, especially at the Budget Office of the Federation, by the Permanent Secretary, State House (who is operationally responsible for the budget of the Presidency) and most importantly at the National Assembly is why an organisation named Presidential Foreign Intervention Promotion Council is needed at all and deserving of budgetary allocation. Ordinarily, any institution not backed by law should not be able to draw money from the budget. But there are probably many non-statutory institutions receiving money directly and indirectly from the public purse. The famous Orosanye Report flagged this anomaly many years ago. But the anomaly did not end, and the fact that this bad practice has been normalised over time most likely made it easy for PFIPC to get a pass.
Beyond the issue of legal backing, there is the not-so-small issue of what the purpose of PFIPC is and whether it amounts to a duplication of an existing institution. Maybe foreign intervention promotion has a meaning, but it is not obvious. If all those on the executive side were unable or unlikely to ask what the agency stands for and what it is supposed to do, those on the legislative side have no excuse for not asking. When it suits them, our legislators like reminding the rest of us that they have constitutional backing to exercise the power of the purse, and that they can add to or remove from or even reject executive proposals. PFIPC is one valid instance to turn down executive proposal in its entirety.
To be passed, the budget of PFIPC would have been defended before committees of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. So, did our legislators ask why we need a budget-funded presidential council on foreign intervention promotion? Did they ask what foreign intervention promotion really means? Did they see the terms of reference or the functions of the council and were they really convinced that the agency was both necessary and deserving of scarce public funds? It will be good to know which committees passed the PEAC/PFIPC budget and see reports of their proceedings.
Were members of the committees bothered about how the operation of PFIPC could impinge on the mandate of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC), a statutory body that was created in 1995 and came on stream in 1997? It is possible our legislators asked these questions but I am yet to come across any such reports, and budget defence at the committee level is usually covered by the press. It is worth noting that most committees have members across party lines. There is no public reports of our legislators, including those from the opposition, asking these questions, even if just to posture or grandstand. Rather, the National Assembly approved N1.3 billion for PEAC/PFIPC, a nebulous agency, and just slightly higher (N1.5 billion) for NIPC, an agency statutorily charged with investment promotion (both domestic and foreign), investment facilitation, and investor protection and support.
The twinning of PEAC with PFIPC should have been another flag for our legislators. President Muhammadu Buhari created the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC) on 16th September 2019 and inaugurated it on 9th October 2019. The PEAC was led by Dr. Doyin Salami (who later became the Chief Economic Adviser to the President) and the council was made up of eight seasoned economists, including Professor Charles Soludo, Professor Ode Ojowu, Dr. Iyabo Masha, and Dr. Mohammed Sagagi. Membership of PEAC lapsed with the end of the Buhari administration. So, does the budget for PEAC/PFIPC indicate the resuscitation of PEAC? What is the relationship between economic advisory council and foreign intervention promotion council? Who are the members of these council(s) and what are their professional antecedents and personal pedigree? Are the two agencies the same or separate? Is the allocation for one or the two of them? What is the rationale for having a budget code for co-joined institutions tagged as PEAC/PFIPC?
Asking these questions could have helped to surface a few things. It can be argued that these questions might be above the paygrade of most civil servants who are processing supposed approvals. But they are legitimate and valid questions for the legislators. The legislative arm of government is empowered by the constitution to act as a counterforce to the executive arm. And the budget defence process presents the most profound opportunity not only for the exercise of all legislative powers but also for checks and balance, especially in a presidential system. However, when you have parliamentarians who are too pliant, who see budget defence, approval and oversight as great opportunities for transaction and extraction, and who go to a great length to diminish the integrity of the budgeting process, not a few things would fall through the cracks.
Another major question that should have been asked at different points is why a new agency would need 300 staff members. Assuming that PEAC/PFIPC has a reason to exist alongside NIPC, why would it need 300 staff to do whatever that its job is? For context, NIPC has a total of 158 staff on its staff nominal roll as at 25th August 2025, based on detailed information proactively disclosed on its website (https://nipc.gov.ng/publications/nipc-staff-nominal-roll). This, by the way, is a statutory institution that has been in existence since 1997. The Office of the Head of Service, which gave PEAC/PFIPC the waiver to employ 300 staff members of different cadres, should have asked why a new agency needs so many staff members? The budget office that included N803 million as allocation for personnel for this new agency in the proposed budget and the National Assembly that approved the same should have asked why a new agency would need 300 hands at take-off.
I can wager that the reason no eyebrow was raised about that magical number is because so many interests have been factored into it. The way things go in our public service, almost anyone who exercises some form of oversight, who provides any form of favour or who needs to be pleased would have been promised some slots. This is how we end up with bloated workforce and agencies with overlapping functions. At the root of this very sad episode is how a majority of our politicians, bureaucrats and even citizens see public office as the place you go to help yourself and those close to you. When those assigned to enforce controls are so consumed with how to extract benefits for themselves and those close to them, checks will become checkpoints that will be leveraged for personal ends.
There are many factors at play in this utterly shameful saga, but it is the pervasive prebendal mindset that has made a royal mess of institutionalised checks. And beyond establishing infractions, meting out punishments and strengthening checks, changing this deeply entrenched mindset about public office and public resources is where the real, and the most difficult, work is.