This article is an abstract rendition of the dynamics of war. When two warring factions engage in battle, their ultimate aim is victory. How that victory is achieved is a combination of factors. Tactics, strategy, and execution form the tripod that makes or mars an operation. Have we wondered why small nations can win big wars? Why are we still in battle with insurgents and terrorists? Do these non-state actors have a better arsenal than our Armed Forces? What do we think is at play?
Let me attempt to explain why small nations can win big wars, using Boko Haram as an example. The Armed Forces of Nigeria boast of an outstanding war arsenal. Boko Haram does not have a fraction of what we have in this regard, yet they have sustained the war for 17 years. They get more daring every passing day. What could be responsible for this? I have read several commentaries on concepts like internal sabotage, money-making ventures, complacency, and several other conspiracy theories. Philosophy and logic in war are not about military strength. It is about strategy and execution. This can be explained using the culinary example of preparing a pot of jollof rice.
Condiments and Seasoning
In preparing a pot of jollof rice, how the meal turns out is not a function of the quantum of condiments and seasoning available, but its application. When you add them in disproportionate quantities, it ruins the taste. This is why military strength is not the major deciding factor in war. If it were, Boko Haram, ISWAP, and any other terrorist group would have long been history. The condiments and seasoning are the philosophy, but the logic is determining the proportionate quantity needed to deliver a delicious pot of jollof rice.
What is the philosophy of logic and how does it relate to war? Literally, it is the application of logical methods to philosophical problems. For example, why is it advisable that we look before leaping? It is a reminder that the ability to leap is not in doubt, but whether you will land well after leaping is. Anyone who wants to leap expects to land well, but if you don’t look carefully at whether where you will land can hold your weight, you have defeated logic. And the end result will be a bad fall. Philosophy in this context is where you might probably land when you leap, and logic is the type of leap you should take to land well. The leaping prowess is not the focus; what is in focus is the landing area and how to land well. This is what Boko Haram has utilized effectively in the past 17 years. They look before they leap because they can’t match the military strength of the Armed Forces. This is the logic behind their perceived success all this while. This leads us to the concept of outfighting and outthinking in war.
Outfight or outthink?
Outfighting is combat. Outthinking is strategy. Which is preferable? Are we outthinking or outfighting? The recently launched “National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Strategic Plan 2025–2030” is an inkling of the reality we have embraced, which was long overdue. The emphasis on community resilience caught my attention. It documents that psychological and structural resilience is critical in war. The logic in this proposition is that it is about looking before leaping (psychological) and ensuring that we don’t lose ground to terrorist activities (structural). It is a fusion of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies toward an overarching objective.
This strategy is logical. It is akin to asking why we have shock absorbers in vehicles. It is the anticipation that roads can sometimes be bumpy and the shock absorbers will assist the navigation of the vehicle in such circumstances. This is the philosophy of logic, and when applied to war situations, it becomes the “Center of Gravity” as expounded by Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz in his classic work On War. He stated that the “Center of Gravity changes depending on the nature of the conflict and the political structure of the adversary. It is rarely a fixed geographic point; it is usually an operational or psychological reality.” He argued that “every operational action must answer a single question: Does this strike a blow against the enemy’s main source of stability? If it doesn’t, it is a diversion of energy into the ‘province of chance.’”
The Province of Chance
War enters the “province of chance” when “chance” dominates the battlefield through several distinct mechanisms. War is fought by humans where fear, fatigue, and panic interplay. When this happens, the philosophy of logic determines the outcome of the war. This ultimately misleads conventional armies into believing they are up against familiar foes. This is the trap most conventional armies fall for. War is not static. It is dynamic. The strategy must, therefore, be dynamic. This is why logic comes into play. And to arrive at it, there must be a philosophy around it. If the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Strategic Plan 2025–2030 is implemented to the letter, it will be good news. And if otherwise, we will continue to struggle.
The philosophy of logic is an action guided by principle, and the logic of philosophy is a principle applied to an earlier action. When a war action is guided by principle, it means that logic was applied before enforcement. But when a war action is a principle applied to action, it means cleaning up the consequences of the action that was applied. Most successful wars are won without pulling the trigger. When triggers are pulled, it is no longer a war but a struggle for legitimacy between the warring factions.
The Art of War
This was corroborated by the Chinese military strategist, Sun Tzu, in his work The Art of War, which touched on breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting. Figuratively, Sun Tzu’s position is that “once the shooting starts, you are no longer just fighting an enemy; you are fighting to prove you had the right to fight them in the first place.” To break the enemy’s resistance without fighting is outthinking. And it requires cutting off their oxygen supply. To cut their oxygen supply is to ensure that the war is framed as a war against the people and not just the government, and it is the responsibility of the people to ensure that they do not serve as accessories to the intent and purposes of the criminal elements among us. This is the game changer and the reality before us. This is the community resilience that was captured in the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Strategic Plan 2025–2030.
My two cents is that this strategic plan should not stop at the policy level; there must be commensurate actions to implement it. And the implementation should not be business as usual. The National Counter Terrorism Centre must act as an interventionist agency by ramping up its drive toward winning the hearts and minds of the people through strategic means and methods.
– Ocheja, PhD, is an alumnus of the Nigerian Defence Academy, military historian, creative writer, and the author of “War and Mosquito Nets”.
