A Palace coup is one in which the sudden and decisive change of government illegally or by force is carried out by individuals in positions of authority who are themselves part and parcel of the ruling regime.  In other words, one group of members of the Palace court seizes control from another group while the people look on. Palace coups have occurred since antiquity.  

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The story of how the third ranking member of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), then Chief of Army Staff, Major General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB) ousted the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief, Major General Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria in August 1985, is the subject of this article.

BACKGROUND
In June 1983, among the new graduates of the Nigerian Defence Academy was 23 year old 2/Lt. P. Odoba.  After commissioning, he was deployed to the Brigade of Guards Garrison, Lagos to begin a journey, the twists and turns of which he could not have guessed in his wildest dreams. 

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On December 31, 1983, Odoba was the duty officer at the Radio Station, Federal Radio Corporation, Ikoyi, Lagos. The night before he was casually told by the Acting Commander of the Brigade of Guards, Lt. Col. Sabo Aliyu that some armored vehicles and soldiers would be coming to the radio station for an ‘exercise’ and that he should not ask questions or resist. He complied

Shortly thereafter, Brigadier Sani Abacha, then Commander of the 9th Mechanized Infantry Brigade based at Ikeja, arrived to deliver the speech that ended the regime of President Shehu Shagari and Nigeria’s second experiment with democracy. Brigadier Muhammadu Buhari, former GOC of the 3rd Armoured Division,  emerged as the Head of State, while Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, former Military Secretary, was appointed Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters and Brigadier Ibrahim Babangida, former Director of Army Staff Duties and Plans – and the operational backbone of the coup – assumed the position of Chief of Army Staff [http://www.gamji.com/nowa13.htm].

Declaring itself an “offshoot” of the Murtala-Obasanjo government of the late seventies, the Buhari regime purged the uppermost echelon of the Armed Forces, retiring all officers of the rank of Major General equivalent or above at the time of the coup.  But that was not all.  Some lower ranking officers, including Captain M Bala Shagari, the former President’s son were also retired.  In time to come his junior brother, Musa, would also be thrown out of the AirForce Secondary School in Jos.  Buhari detained most political leaders of the Second Republic, accusing them of indiscipline and profligacy.   For the first time in Nigerian history, the  country’s security organizations were actively used to track down alleged acts of corruption through the Special Investigation Bureau preparatory to formal military style trials at Bonny Camp.  As had been the initial practice by various prior military regimes, special asset recovery military tribunals were set up all over the country.  A “War against Indiscipline” (WAI) was launched.  Such indiscipline was interpreted broadly to mean lack of environmental cleanliness, lack of manners (such as failing to take one’s place in queues), corruption, smuggling, desecration of the flag and disloyalty to the anthem.

The State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree Number 2 of 1984 gave the Chief of Staff,  Supreme Headquarters (Major General Idiagbon) the power to detain anyone labelled a security risk for up to six months without trial.  Decree Number 4 of 1984 was promulgated to prevent journalists from reporting news that could potentially embarrass government officials. Nduka Irabor  and Tunde Thompson  were convicted under the decree.   Some high visibility special interest groups, including the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) and Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), ran afoul of the government and were outlawed.  The  Labour Congress was banned from undertaking strike action.

In July 1984, in what was clearly a high risk move, the Buhari government – allegedly assisted by Israeli intelligence – unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap Alhaji Umaru Dikko, self-exiled 2nd republic Transportation Minister, from a flat in London.  He was grabbed while taking a stroll, bundled into a van, intubated and placed on ventilator support supervised by an Israeli anesthesiologist, then placed into a crate and taken to Stansted airport outside London. Just before embarkation on a Lagos bound cargo plane suspicious British Police and customs officers – already alerted by Dikko’s assistant who witnessed the kidnap from her window – aborted the heist.  The incident created a diplomatic storm and even resulted in tit-for-tat seizures of Nigerian and British Airways aircraft in London and Lagos.  High Commissioners to both countries were withdrawn – and were not reinstated until February 1986.

As fate would have it, twenty months later on Sallah Day, Id-el-Kabir August 26/27, 1985, Odoba, now a full lieutenant, was again at the FRCN Radio station in Ikoyi as the duty officer. Once again he was told by his Garrison Commander not to resist when he sees armored vehicles approaching for yet another ‘exercise’. Shortly thereafter, Colonel Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro, Director of Manning (“A” Branch) and concurrent Director of the Department of Armour at the Army Headquarters arrived, barely taking notice of the young officer.

At 0600 hours on Tuesday August 27, 1985, snoozy from the laid back atmosphere of a moslem public holiday, unsuspecting Nigerians woke up to familiar cycles of martial music interspersed with a radio announcement made in an unfamiliar voice.  It was Dogonyaro.  Among other things, he said: ‘A small group of individuals in the Supreme Military Council had abused their power and failed to listen to the advice of their colleagues or the public, about tackling the country’s economic problems.’

He then announced that the regime of Major General Muhammadu Buhari had been deposed. Hours later, at about 1 pm, the more familiar voice of Brigadier Sani Abacha, then GOC, 2nd Mechanized Division of the Nigerian Army, based in Ibadan, came on to announce the appointment of Major General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, then Chief of Army Staff, as the new Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Babangida, having flown back to the capital from Minna, in his home state, where he was allegedly on vacation, subsequently took the title of ‘President’.

The position of Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters was eliminated. Navy Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, then Flag Officer Commanding, Western Naval Command was appointed to the new position of Chief of General Staff (CGS) at the General Staff HQ.  This subtle change in title neatly removed the service chiefs from any kind of direct reporting relationship to the new CGS.

WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR THE COUP?
All coups are usually justified in high brow terms designed to appeal to the emotions and patriotism of the uninformed public.  This was no different.  Each of the three speeches made that day – by Dogonyaro, Abacha and finally by Babangida himself went to great lengths to rationalize the Palace coup and make expedient gestures designed to appeal to cheap populist instincts.

The official line was that the erstwhile Head of State and his deputy (Major General Tunde Idiagbon) were guilty of dictatorial lack of consultation with their military colleagues, gross abuse of human rights, exemplified by mass detention of politicians and others without due process, proscription of professional organizations, muzzling of the Press and promulgation of retroactive laws (e.g. execution of drug peddlers).  To this was added insensitivity to respected leaders of thought in various parts of Nigeria, the issue of counter-trade and alleged intent to take the IMF Loan against popular wishes.

The real problem, however, was a profound personality clash and divergence of expectations and priorities among the officers (and civilians) who originally conspired to effect (or benefit from) the removal of President Shagari in 1983.  Indeed, Buhari, although peripherally involved in that plot, was not an insider and was not critically operationally active by virtue of his posting at the time in Jos – away from key centers of power.  It has since come to light that he may have owed his emergence as the new C-in-C on January 1, 1984 to the near solo effort of Major Mustafa Jokolo of the Military Police who later became his ADC.

Jokolo reportedly convinced his fellow middle ranking inner circle storm troopers in Lagos to adopt the ascetic and relatively clean Buhari, fresh from battle victories along the Lake Chad border, as an acceptable national figure to unite the armed forces as a whole behind the change and give it the façade of a patriotic putsch.  Jokolo’s efforts were no doubt assisted by Babangida’s lack of interest in the job at that point in time – as well as the death of a key plotter, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako, in murky circumstances.  Unconfirmed news reports – never in short supply in gossip rich Nigeria – quote Babangida as telling confidants that he was “not yet ready to move over to the other (political) side.”

WHO WERE THE KEY CONSPIRATORS? WHEN WERE THEY RECRUITED?
As Head of State, Buhari’s isolation from the military was gradual but relentless.  It began almost as soon as he came to power in 1984.  While he  was fixated on purely political national issues with religious fervor, he did not notice that specific officers were being quietly placed in specific operational positions to lay in wait like ‘sleepers’ until they would be called upon to strike by the very service chiefs he had naively placed his trust in to run the armed forces on his behalf.

A classic example was the way then Lt. Col. Halilu Akilu, already a Grade 1 Staff Officer in the Directorate, was inserted into the office of Director of Military Intelligence while the regular person on seat, then Lt. Col. MC Alli, was away to Britain and the US for a very brief official assignment establishing liaison with other military intelligence groups.  MC Alli had been deputising for Col. Aliyu Mohammed who had left for a course at the Royal College of Defence Studies  after assisting the overthrow of President Shagari.  [Aliyu Mohammed later returned to start up the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) with Col.  S. Anthony Ukpo as his deputy – although the DIA was not formally established in law until June 1986 when Decree Number 19 was promulgated].  Akilu was Babangida’s mole in the intelligence community, a counterweight to Alhaji Muhammadu Lawal Rafindadi, Buhari’s loyal Director of the Nigerian Security Organization (NSO).

Officers who would be crucial to Babangida’s take-over in 1985 had been cultivated for many years dating back to their days as cadets in the Nigerian Defence Academy between 1970 and 1972 when then Major Babangida, having recovered from war injuries suffered at Uzuakoli as CO of the 44th battalion in the 1st division under Colonel Shuwa was made an Instructor and Company Commander in the Short Service Wing (pairing up with his coursemate and rival, Major MJ Vatsa of the Regular wing).  Simultaneously, over the years, aided by the convenience of his permanent military posting to the Federal capital interrupted only by foreign courses from late 1973 until 1985, Babangida developed intricate connections with civilian contacts in business, the media, civil service, academia and religious circles. He even devoted his thesis at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) in 1979 to the question of civil-military relations.  He also skillfully manipulated the military sub-culture of “welfare”, through personal generosity and expressions of interest in the personal lives and problems of junior officers, endearing himself to many.

THE PLAYERS OF AUGUST
At strategic, operational, and tactical levels a large number of general staff, field grade, company grade and non-commissioned officers made August 27, 1985 possible.  Some were physically involved in military operations on D-Day; while others partook in the elaborate game of deception and disinformation that preceded the coup.  However, as in all coups there were overlapping concentric rings or tiers of involvement with the lowest echelons being brought into the picture within the last 6 – 24 hours of the operation, in some cases by being misled as to the real nature of what was going on.

KEY PLAYERS IN SUPPORT OF THE COUP INCLUDED (BUT WERE NOT LIMITED TO):
1. Major General Ibrahim Babangida – Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
2. Brigadier Sani Abacha – GOC, 2nd Mechanised Division, Ibadan

3. Colonel JT Dogonyaro – Director, Department of Armour, Army HQ

4. Colonel Aliyu Mohammed Gusau – former Director, Defence Intelligence Agency.
5. Lt. Col. Halilu Akilu – Director of Military Intelligence
6. Lt. Col. Tanko Ayuba – Commander, Corps of Signals
7. Lt. Col. David Mark – Military Governor, Niger State
8. Lt. Col. John Nanzip Shagaya – Commander, 9th Mechanised Brigade
9. Lt. Col. Chris Abutu Garuba – Commander, 34 Self Propelled Artillery Brigade, Jos
10. Lt. Col. Raji Alagbe Rasaki – Commanding Officer, AHQ Garrison and Signals Group, Lagos
11. Col. Anthony Ukpo – Deputy Director, Defence Intelligence Agency, Lagos
12. Major John Madaki – Commanding Officer, 123 Guards Battalion, Ikeja
13. Major Abdulmumuni Aminu – Military Assistant to the COAS
14. Major Lawan Gwadabe – just back from US Armour School, Fort Knox, returning to 245 Recce Battalion where he was the former Commanding Officer
15. Major Abubakar Dangiwa Umar –  General Staff Officer (1), Department of Armour, AHQ, then Chairman Federal Housing Authority
16. Major Mohammed Sambo Dasuki, Staff Officer, HQ Corps of Artillery (and son of Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, who later became the 17th Sultan of Sokoto).
17. Major Maxwell Khobe-Commanding Officer, 245 Recce Battalion, Ikeja
18. Major UK Bello-Commanding Officer, 202 Recce Battalion, Kaduna
19. Major Kefas Happy Bulus-Commanding Officer, Armour Headquarters Company (201-Administrative-Unit) Ikeja
20. Major Sule Ahman, Supply and Transport, Ikeja Cantonment
21. Major Musa Shehu (2ic to the Commanding Officer, Recce Battalion in Jos)
22. Captain Nuhu Umaru- 2ic, 202 Recce Battalion, Kaduna

In support of the Key players a chorus of other company and field grade officers also played various supportive roles. These included (but were not limited to)
1. Lt. Col. Ahmed Daku
2. Lt. Col. Abubakar Dada
3. Major IB Aboho (Staff Officer at Defence Intelligence Agency)
4. Major Friday Ichide (Staff Officer to Colonel Dogonyaro)
5. Major Simon Hart
6. Captain M. Bashir (Lagos operations, in support of Bulus)
7. Major S.B. Mepaiyeda
8. Captain Victor Scott Kure (physical security for the COAS).

NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS in the Armoured corps who were crucial to the mobilization of armoured vehicles in Lagos include
1. WOII Sule Ayinla
2. WOII Billy Adekunle
3. WOII Army Sweet
4. WOII Yerima
5. S-Sgt Bazaria Kabara
6. Sgt. Hitler Bongo
7. Corporal Sule Owoicho, and others.

In addition there was another mixed tier of crucial but less mission critical enablers.  Some were “aware” but not “active”.  These included:
1. Brigadier Peter Ademokhai (Director of Army Staff Duties and Plans)
2. Brigadier Abdullahi Bagudu Mamman (Director of Army Training and Operations)
3. Brigadier YY Kure (GOC 82 Division, Enugu)
4. Brigadier Ola Oni (GOC, 1st Division, Kaduna)
5. Lt. Col. John Inienger, Commander, 4th  Mechanized Brigade, Benin
6. Lt. Col. Tunji Olurin, Commander, 1st Mechanized Brigade, Minna
7. Lt. Col. A. Abubakar, Commander, 3rd Mechanised Brigade, Kano.

Although they had no operational commands, a number of Military Governors formed part of the BODY OF OPINION in the military that encouraged the palace coup, reflecting the wide nature of the plot and near total isolation of Generals Buhari and Idiagbon.  They included (but were not limited to):
1. Brigadier Garba Duba (Sokoto State)
2. Brigadier IOS Nwachukwu (Imo State)
3. Brigadier Jeremiah Timbut Useni (Bendel State).

ON THE OTHER HAND, KEY PLAYERS IN SUPPORT OF THE REGIME INCLUDED:
1. Major General Muhammadu Buhari, C-in-C
2. Major General Tunde Idiagbon, Chief of Staff, SHQ
3. Major General Mohammed Magoro – Minister of Internal Affairs
4. Alhaji Rafindadi – Director General, Nigerian Security Organization
5. Lt. Col. Sabo Aliyu – Commander, Brigade of Guards
6. Major Mustapha Haruna Jokolo, ADC to the C-in-C

OFFICERS WHOSE LOYALTY TO THE REGIME WAS STRONG ENOUGH THAT THEY HAD TO BE PRESUMED HOSTILE AND NEUTRALISED INCLUDED:
1. Brigadier Salihu Ibrahim, GOC 3rd Armoured Division, Jos
2. Commanding Officer, Recce Battalion, Jos.

Last updated on November 15th, 2024 at 10:54 am